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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE P. JONES, 
P l a i n t i f f and Appe l l an t . 
- v -
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 20635 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QE-2BE-£hSE 
This i s an appeal from an order of dr iver l icense 
revocation issued by the Third Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t Court in and for 
Sa l t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond L. Uno, 
pres iding. 
The Third D i s t r i c t Court held a t r i a l de novo on 
February 19, 1985 to determine whether Mr. Jones1 d r i v e r ' s 
l icense should be revoked under Utah's implied consent s t a t u t e . 
In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953) as amended, 
the t r i a l court found t h a t : 
1. The a r res t ing off icer had reasonable cause to and 
did a r r e s t the p e t i t i o n e r . 
2. The pe t i t ioner was properly requested to take a 
chemical t e s t , pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953) as 
amended, and warned of the consequences if he refused, and the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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pe t i t ioner did refuse and did not immediately thereaf ter 
unconditionally request the o f f i c e r ' s t e s t . 
3. Since the pe t i t ioner refused to submit to a 
chemical t e s t and thus violated the implied consent s t a t u t e , his 
pe t i t i on should be denied and his l icense should be revoked for 
one year which would expire on May 6, 1986. 
SIAlEMEN3LjaiLI^D^ 
1. The appeal issues presented are whether the t r i a l 
court properly found that the a r res t ing officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe tha t the appellant was driving or in actual 
physical control of the vehic le . 
2 . Whether the t r i a l court properly found tha t the 
a r res t ing off icer had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
appellant was under the influence of alcohol . 
3 . Whether the a r res t ing officer properly requested 
the appellant to submit to a chemical t e s t pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (amended 1983). 
4 . Whether the Court p re jud ic ia l ly erred or not in 
admitting as evidence for a l imited purpose the sworn DUI report 
prepared by the a r res t ing o f f i ce r . 
S21£EN^„QE-EA£T2 v 
On April 9 f 1984, Trooper Lynn Richardson received a 
radio ca l l notifying him of a burglary and describing the 
suspects and the i r vehicle (R. 63). Trooper Richardson then 
observed a vehicle which matched the exact descr ipt ion and 
followed i t f watching the driving pat tern for about 10 miles . He 
then stopped the vehicle and held the three occupants unt i l c i t y 
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officers Bruce Beal and then Chris Neal arrived to transport them 
to the Juab Jail (R. 64). Trooper Richardson and witnesses 
pointed out Mr. Jones as the driver in a conversation with 
Officer Nielson which took place in front of Mr. Jones (R. 64, 
65, 72). The appellee did not there or at any time thereafter 
deny that he was the driver (R. 82). He and the vhicle 
registered to him matched the dispatch descriptions (R. 64, 65). 
At the scene and later. Officer Nielson detected the 
strong odor of alcohol on the plaintiff and noticed his bloodshot 
eyes, slurred speech, and flushed face (R. 72, 86). The vehicle 
which was registered to the plaintiff was searched at the scene 
(R. 71). The officers found several beer cans in the back of the 
pickup and one partially full can of beer in the front of the 
vehicle on the console (R. 71). The driver "appeared very 
agitated, very hyperactive, and his face was flushed, eyes were 
bloodshot, speech was very slurred" (R. 73). The driver was 
arrested, detained and transported to the county jail. 
After transporting all three suspects to the Juab Jail, 
Officer Nielson reminded Bruce Jones that he "was under arrest 
for driving under the influence of alcohol." He replied, "That's 
what I've heard." He was also asked to take a breath test (R. 
73). Mr. Jones refused saying, "No reason for it" (R. 73). 
Officer Nielson then read the plaintiff the consequences of a 
refusal warning him that if he refused "he can have his license 
revoked" (R. 74). Mr. Jones again refused, then saying that he 
wanted to make a phone call first (R. 75). Officer Nielson then 
told Mr. Jones that his duty to take the test was not conditional 
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on being able to make a phone call (R. 75). He warned him that 
the test was civil in nature and that "unless he submitted to the 
test, he would be considered to have refused." He read the 
plaintiff his Miranda rights and the implied consent admonition 
again and again requested that Mr. Jones take the test. Mr. 
Jones again insisted that he be allowed to make a phone call 
first and was told a phone call was not a condition of taking the 
test (R. 26). The driver and counsel did not "argue" or contest 
that there was a proper refusal (R. 77, L.22). 
After the refusal. Officer Nielson asked Mr. Jones if 
he would respond to questions and Jones replied that it would 
"depend on the questions" (R. 78). The officer then continued 
with the interview portion of the form. During the interview, 
besides other responses, the appellant stated that he had been 
driving the vehicle (R. 81). The officer's report was admitted 
into evidence as part of a continuing pattern (R. 87) to show 
that the refusal responses were voluntary, that he must have 
understood the warnings that were given, that the interview 
answers given were responsive to the question (R. 77) , and that 
he never did deny that he had been driving the vehicle (R. 79). 
The trial court ruled that the officer had cause to 
arrest the petitioner. The one year statutory revocation would 
be over on May 6, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent argues that the court properly found that 
the peace officer had reasonable grounds to make the DUI arrest 
based on uncontradicted circumstantial evidence such as another 
-4-
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t r a i n e d o f f i c e r ' s s t a t e m e n t s , r e g i s t r a t i o n of v e h i c l e , and 
w i t n e s s s t a t e m e n t s . , 
ABGIUEEI 
PQIfflLJ 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS 
TO BELIEVE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING 
AND HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF 
THE VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND THUS THE DRIVER WAS PROPERLY 
REQUESTED TO TAKE A CHEMICAL INTOXILYZER TEST. 
U t a h ' s impl i ed consent s t a t u t e f Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 -
44 .10 s t a t e s t h a t any person o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e i n the 
s t a t e i s deemed t o have g i v e n h i s consent t o a chemical t e s t 
(brea th , b lood or ur ine ) to determine i f the d r i v e r was d r i v i n g 
under the i n f l u e n c e of drugs or a l c o h o l . The peace o f f i c e r 
merely needs t o have "grounds to b e l i e v e t h a t person t o have been 
d r i v i n g or in a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l of a motor v e h i c l e . . . w h i l e 
under the i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l . . . " The Department must show by a 
preponderance of the ev idence t h a t the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r had 
"grounds to b e l i e v e " and those grounds must be " r e a s o n a b l e . " 
B a l l 3 I < l ^ _ J S : t a ± £ - M ^ ^ 5 95 P. 2d 13 0 2 , 1306 
(Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . The u n c o n t r a d i c t e d ev idence be fore the t r i a l court 
preponderated t h a t 1) t h e person was or had been i n a c t u a l 
p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l and 2) the person was then under the i n f l u e n c e . 
G^XjCija-YjL^^W^ndimail, 645 P.2d 6 5 1 , 652 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . 
Those grounds can be the t o t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , from 
o b s e r v a t i o n , w i t n e s s e s , s t a t e m e n t s , and " i n f e r e n c e s " t h a t can 
f a i r l y be drawn. In S±At£_.^^_HluJ:ifiBi)jai;Jk, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 
1980) t h e Utah Supreme Court s e t down the e l ements c o n s t i t u t i n g 
reasonable grounds for an a r r e s t w i t h o u t a warrant . "The 
- 5 -
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determination should be made on an objective standard: whether 
from the facts known to the officer, aild_:Ul£_ilLfj^ £JD^ L£.s which 
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense." Id. at 106 (emphasis added). 
According to the uncontradicted testimony before the 
trial courtf Officer Nielson was justified in believing that the 
appellant was the driver of the vehicle. The officer making the 
stop, Trooper Richardson, who must have had certain and personal 
knowledge, pointed out Jones as the driver to Officer Nielson. 
Jones did not deny that assertion, although it was stated in 
front of him. Jones was the registered owner of the vehicle 
matching the description of the recently fleeing vehicle. 
Appellant argues that Officer Nielson could not have 
had reasonable grounds upon which to base his belief that Jones 
was the driver because Nielson did not actually "see" him drive. 
However, the case law points out that "certain knowledge of 
guilt" is not required. State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d 159, 1260 
(Utah 1972). Reasonableness under the total circumstances is 
still the test. In Ballard, the arresting officer arrived after 
the automobile was stationary in a burrow pit. The officer 
arrested the plaintiff after questioning him and talking with 
witnesses. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that 
the state could not independently, without his admissions, 
establish that he was in actual physical control. The criminal 
rules of evidence were not applied to the civil case. The court 
ruled that the evidence was sufficient. Id. at 1305. In Stats 
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v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1983) , the jury believed appellant 
to be the driver of the vehicle that caused the collision, 
although neither the witnesses nor the arresting officer who 
arrived some time after the accident had actually seen the 
appellant driving. The Court held that there was "sufficient 
circumstantial evidencen from the witnesses, who testified to 
having seen appellant crawl out of the vehicle, to justify the 
jury's belief and the officer's belief that appellant was the 
driver of the vehicle. In both HallaLd and Lawson, the arresting 
officer did not see the appellant drive, however the court held 
their grounds for belief to be reasonable even though it was 
based upon citizens' statements and circumstantial evidence. 
Certainly, the trial court in this case could find that Officer 
Nielson could reasonably believe that Jones was the driver, where 
that belief was based in part upon the uncontradicted statements 
of a fellow officer, one he knew and with whom he had previously 
worked. Surely Trooper Richardson was a source of "reasonably 
trustworthy information." Ballard, at 13 06. The vehicle was 
also registered to the arrestee and matched the description of 
the fleeing vehicle. None of these circumstances or testimony 
were denied or refuted by the appellant at the trial. Therefore 
the trial court's discretion and findings should be upheld. 
The appellant asserts that the arrest for driving under 
the influence of alcohol was improper because Jones was first 
arrested by Trooper Richardson on a suspicion of burglary charge. 
However, the record shows that Richardson was only detaining the 
appellant and his passengers until Officers Nielson and Beal 
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appellant and his passengers until Officers Nielson and Beal 
arrived (R. 36). Richardson had initially detained appellant 
because his vehicle and his personal appearance matched the 
description given over his radio. It was Officer Beal who 
arrested Mr, Jones for burglary, before Officer Nielson arrested 
him for drunk driving. The fact that Jones was initially 
arrested for one offense and subsequently charged with another , 
offense that the officer did not actually see does not render the 
arrest invalid. See State v. Bryan. 395 P.2d 539 (Utah 1964) , 
allowing a subsequent DUI arrest and auto homicide prosecution 
and conviction was allowed even though "not committed in the 
presence of the arresting officer." 
Officer Nielson also had reasonable grounds to believe 
that Mr. Jones was under the influence. He could smell a strong 
odor of alcohol on the appellant as well as detect his bloodshot 
eyes, slurred speech, and flushed face. There was also an open 
can of beer j.n his own vehicle within easy reach of the 
appellant. It is not unreasonable to base one's belief that a 
person is intoxicated upon that person's demeanor and appearance. 
See Ballard, supra. See also Lawson, supra and CLaiXLijS-
The appellant was properly requested to take a chemical 
test pursuant to the implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.10(2). The facts show that appellant was arrested, 
received his Miranda warning, and only then was asked to take the 
test. Following Jones response, "No reason for it," Officer 
Nielson explained the consequences of a refusal and warned him , 
that he could lose his license for a year. Jones answered by 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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explained that Jones duty to take the test was not conditioned by 
a phone call. When Jones persisted in his behavior, the officer 
warned him that his conduct would be considered a refusal. B&£k 
v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979) (refusal may be established on 
the basis of the conduct of the motorist without an express 
refusal if he has clearly been asked to take the test). Despite 
that warning, Jones did not immediately request the test." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(1). 
POINT II 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S DUI REPORT WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS A BUSINESS RECORDS 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
The trial court properly admitted the DUI Report of 
Officer Nielsen into evidence. This is a civil case and it was 
offered and admitted for limited purposes. It was solely to show 
that there was "no indication that he did not understand what the 
consequences would be" (R. 77, L. 24). His responses were 
objective manifestations of his state of mind or understanding. 
The appellant's counsel did not object to the admission of the 
DUI report into evidence (R. 87). The Utah Rules of Evidence 
803(6) allow business entries and the like to come into evidence 
as an exception to the Hearsay Rule as long as proper foundation 
has been laid. In order to qualify as an exception, the records 
must be 1) made in the regular course of business 2) at about the 
time of the act, condition or event recorded 3) the source of 
information from which made and the method and circumstances of 
preparation were such as to indicate trustworthiness. Government 
records can come in under this rulef for even though the 
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government is not a business, it is an organization which must 
keep records. Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (1978). The essential 
test in deciding whether the exception applies is the 
"reliability of the document"; "a business record may be admitted 
irrespective of the type of organization from which it emanates." 
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1183, (Utah 1983). This report 
may be excluded in a criminal case, depending on the use and 
purpose of its introduction, but its use in this case is 
"primarily for the trial court to determine." State v. Bryan. 
id. p. 541. 
During the trial, the court determined there was the 
proper foundation for the admittance of the DUI report into 
evidence. Officer Nielson testified that the report was made in 
the course of his duties at or about the time of the arrest (R. 
80) . He signed the report and swore to its truthfulness in front 
of a notary (R. 80-81). The method and the preparation indicate 
trustworthiness; and certainly Officer Nielson is a trustworthy 
source. At the time of the admittance of the record into 
evidence, defense counsel made no objection (R. 87) . Where the 
trial court found the foundation to be sufficient, appellate 
courts will usually not reverse without a "clear showing of abuse 
of his discretionary power." IL&rJieYr at 698. 
The appellant argues that the admission of the DUI 
report was prejudicial because Mr. Jones admits, in the interview 
section following his refusal to take the chemical test, that he 
was the driver of the vehicle. The appellant maintains that the 
trial court must have solely relied on this section of the report 
-10-
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for his determination that Officer Nielson had reasonable grounds 
to believe Mr. Jones was the driver. He cannot so read the 
Courtfs mind, especially since the evidence shows that at the 
time of the arrest, Officer Nielson had ample grounds under the 
circumstances upon which to base his belief that Jones was the 
driver: 1) the information given by Trooper Richardson 2) the 
fact that the vehicle was registered to Bruce Jones 3) its 
description and location and 4) the fact that Jones never denied 
he was the driver — not when Richardson pointed him out as such 
in front of him and not when Nielson arrested him for driving 
under the influence. v 
Although Jones' later admittance to actually being the 
driver supports the reasonableness of Officer Nielson1s prior 
belief and action and the Courtfs Findings, the appellant and 
this Court cannot assume it to be the Court's sole basis for 
probable cause merely because it confirms the reasonableness of 
the arrest and the Court's Findings. Even if Jones had refused 
to answer any questions, the trial court still would have 
concluded, based on the preponderance of the only evidence before 
him, that Officer Nielson had reasonable grounds and cause to 
properly arrest Mr. Jones for driving while intoxicated. 
Since there was other independent evidence and 
circumstances, the DUI Report and admission to driving was not 
prejudicial—it merely contained a comporting confirmation of a 
predetermined reasonable fact and admission to driving. 
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QQUZLUSIQB 
The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r had reasonab le a r t i c u l a b l e 
grounds upon which to b e l i e v e t h a t the a p p e l l a n t was d r i v i n g a 
v e h i c l e whi le i n t o x i c a t e d . Because probable cause for the a r r e s t 
e x i s t e d , the a p p e l l a n t was p roper ly reques ted t o take a chemical 
b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t f which he refused t o do. In a d d i t i o n , the 
t r i a l cour t did not e r r p r e j u d i c i a l l y when i t admit ted the 
a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r ' s DUI Report i n t o ev idence . Therefore f t he 
respondent r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h i s cour t t o uphold the 
d i s c r e t i o n f ind ings of the t r i a l c o u r t t h a t a r e based on the 
test imony and l e t the order of r evoca t ion of a p p e l l a n t ' s d r i v e r ' s 
l i c e n s e s t a n d . 
DATED t h i s j ^ - / " day of Janua ry , 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e v - ^ e n e r a l 
'BRUCE M. HALE 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
CERTirj^AT^QT^MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed four t r u e and exac t 
copies of the foregoing Br ie f , postage p repa id , to Stephen R. 
McCaughey, 72 East 400 South, S u i t e 330, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
84111 t h i s _ day of J anua ry , 1986. 
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